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Abstract This paper studies intergovernmental transfers. Many intergovernmental
transfers are said to serve political purposes. We augment a standard model of politi-
cal career concerns to allow for multilevel governance. When elections are simultaneous,
there is no equilibrium with non-zero transfers as the opportunity cost of a transfer is
too high. However when elections are staggered, an equilibrium exists with positive
transfers. These transfers are motivated by two factors; sabotaging challengers and rent
smoothing. These transfers are non-partisan and an artifact of the electoral dynamics
as prescribed by an electoral calendar and politicians’ career concerns. This model
produces an additional insight in understanding intergovernmental grants. These re-
sults are discussed with reference to the growing literature on the partisan basis of
intergovernmental transfers.
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1 Introduction
Intergovernmental transfers are a large source of revenue for many sub-national gov-
ernments. Often intergovernmental transfers are allocated according to a formula, or
contingent contract. However, many sub-national governments receive discretionary
transfers, strings unattached, in what appears to be an unpredictable manner. More-
over, formulas for intergovernmental transfers are subject to change at the discretion
of politicians. This paper studies the timing and determinants of discretionary inter-
governmental transfers.
Intergovernmental transfers can serve many purposes. Alternatively transfers can serve
an allocative role, assisting recipient governments to internalize externalities associated
with public good spillovers1. In this paper we study the effect of intergovernmental
transfers on the accountability of elected representatives. We begin with a model of
politics where voters use elections to select and discipline politicians. If politicians are
career concerned self-interested actors who consume much of their own budgets as rents
it would be surprising to find politicians willingly giving transfers. However, we show
that when transfers are expected from a challenger, a current incumbent politician has
an incentive to themselves give a transfer. What makes these transfers interesting is
that they are non-partisan, which allows us to understand why much of the empirical
literature on partisan transfers has met with such limited success.
Political economy models of distributive politics have addressed intergovernmental
transfers from two perspectives on how politicians win votes. One point of view is
that these politicians target groups of swing voters to capture their votes, as in Dixit
and Londregan (1996). Another large literature asserts that politicians target transfers
to their core supporters in an effort to motivate their base, see for example Cox and
McCubbins (1986). Both theoretical points of departure have been investigated in a
number of empirical papers each with varying degrees of success.
However both of these theories of intergovernmental transfers are partisan based.
Politicians are partisan actors, and/or voters have partisan preferences in all the exist-
1See Oates (1999) for a review of the literature on fiscal federalism in general and intergovernmental
transfers in particular.
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ing research on intergovernmental transfers. This is quite natural when one considers
a transfer of funds as a targeted expenditure. In models of partisan competition par-
ties serve to solve some conflict of interest2 among voters (i.e. different preferences or
geographical locations); the choice of voters being influenced by a positional aspect of
the political parties. However elections are not only an opportunity for voters to reveal
their preferences for particular regimes, they also serve as the most poignant instance
of “incentives” in the political system. As there may exist a conflict of interest between
voters and politicians (i.e. if each values the use of scarce resources differently) it is
important to recognize that the opportunity for the public to evaluate their elected
representatives occurs at the ballot box. Thus we study the effects of transfers on the
accountability of both donating and receiving politicians.
In this paper we abstract from the conflict of interest across voters and focus instead on
the role of elections in selecting and disciplining politicians. Our approach addresses the
issue from its most basic premise: a transfer of resources from one level of government
to another requires forfeiting the ability to employ those resources in some other way.
We consider an agency model, with office motivated politicians, and voters who desire
public goods. From the point of view of politicians, allocating public goods is costly as
it decreases the rents they can enjoy from office, however politicians are willing to part
with these funds when it increases their ability to win control of office again. When
transfers are made between governments they are either swallowed up by the recipient
politician, or they augment the public expenditure of that level of government. Given
the latter, transfers themselves become coveted by the voters. In our model, voters
who in the absence of the prospect of higher spending through transfers would evaluate
each government only on their performance in office, now cast their ballots with an
additional interest in obtaining transfers.
We show the existence of an equilibrium where transfers take place. The equilibrium
with transfers requires politicians at both levels of office simultaneously seeking re-
election, but with staggered electoral calendars (their terms in office overlap). The
model makes a clear prediction of when we will see intergovernmental transfers with-
out assuming partisan preferences of either voters or incumbent politicians. In addition
to this we have a surprising result that in response to receiving a transfer local govern-
2Persson and Tabellini (2000) makes this distinction.
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ment rent consumption may increase, decrease or remain unchanged depending on the
distribution of unobserved political ability.
Our model does not incorporate partisan preferences of politicians. In particular we
focus on the role of: self-interested politicians, the electoral calender, and the finiteness
of political careers as determinants of the pattern of intergovernmental transfers. This is
seen as a complement to existing studies of partisan transfers, rather than a substitute.
Moreover, this paper can be seen as a first step in understanding the role of parties
in selecting and disciplining politicians in office. Intergovernmental transfers occur
to influence the future re-election prospects of the donating politician. However in
a situation in which partisan approval is necessary to facilitate rent extraction, for
example through a legislative check on the executive or some other aspect of the internal
organization of the party3, these transfers may be side payments to the constituents in
return for current political support.
The paper progresses as follows. In section 2 we address the literature on intergovern-
mental transfers. In section 3 we present the model. Section 4 solves the model. In
section 5 we discuss the results. In section 6 we conclude.
2 Previous Explanations and the Evidence
Intergovernmental transfers have often been studied as equity and efficiency achieving
instruments. There is an excellent review of this literature in Oates (1999). Some
examples of solutions provided by intergovernmental transfers include: the internal-
ization of externalities associated with inter-jurisdictional spillovers, the reduction of
inefficient local revenue raising, and the provision of comparable living standards across
jurisdictions within a federation4. However, the emergence of arguments from the pub-
lic choice, and more recently political economy perspective have drawn attention away
from the purely normative roles of transfers mentioned above.
3See for example Milligan and Smart (2005).
4In addition to these general treatment of the traditional approach, much insight has been provided
on the optimal design of intergovernmental transfer systems. As we are concerned with discretionary
transfers, we will not spend time on reviewing this literature here, rather interested readers are
encouraged again to consult Oates (1999).
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Insights have emerged from the literature on the positive role of intergovernmental
transfers, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically intergovernmental transfers
have been addressed in studies of political redistribution, or pork as it is often referred
to in the literature. The pork literature, of which intergovernmental transfers can
be thought of as a special case, can be divided into those who find that politicians
allocate resources to swing voters and those who allocate resources to core supporters.
Prominent examples of the swing voters view include Lindbeck and Weibull (1987),
Dixit and Londregan (1998); while representative of the core supporters hypothesis is
Cox and McCubbins (1986), and Rodden and Wibbles (2005). Cox (2006) provides a
survey of the empirical literature testing each hypothesis, suggesting that the verdict
is very much still out on which, if either, hypothesis is correct5.
Some recent papers in economics view the direction of transfers to be determined
by political credit claiming concerns. Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillion and Dutta
(2008) studies a situation where voters have preferences for the political ideology of
candidates and the intergovernmental grants received by their state governments, but
are unable to determine which level of government deserves the credit for the grants.
As state and central levels of government are controlled by either the same (aligned) or
different (unaligned) parties with each level of government receiving only partial credit
for the grants, the central governing party allocates more grants to states that are also
governed by them so as to claim full credit for the grants. The model is tested on
data from Indian states, and this feature is confirmed. Sole-Olle and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008) uses a very similar model, but where parties do not care for any considerations
other than their re-election. Still the same prediction arises in this credit claiming
environment and their results are confirmed by Spanish data on central to province,
province to local, as well as central to local transfers. Additionally Khemani (2007)
studies the political determination of intergovernmental transfers exploiting exogenous
variation in the politicization of a grant distribution program finding that partisanship
does influence the direction of political transfers.
Papers that address the conflict of interest between voters and their elected represen-
5Empirical evidence in favor of the core supporters hypothesis, can be found in: Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2003), and Levitt and Snyder (1995) among others. Representative empirical investigations
in support of the swing voters hypothesis include Case (2001), and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002)
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tatives do so in an agency framework. Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley (2006)
present an overview of many of the workhorse models used in this field. Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986) are pioneering texts on the agency based view of electoral com-
petition. Rogoff (1990) and a string of other empirical papers find strong evidence
that political actors respond to voters when retaining office matters, and to their own
self interests otherwise. Reid (1994) finds evidence from Canada that intergovernmen-
tal transfers are not exempted from the political budget cycle. Likewise Besley and
Case (1995) and Lidborn-Peters (2003) have found evidence that politicians react to
re-election concerns.
Two recent working papers address the vertical interactions of political agents in the
above framework. Reich (2008) studies the effects of exogenous federal transfer schemes
on political accountability at the local level in a model of adverse selection. Reich finds
that transfers influence the re-election rates of incumbents differently depending on the
extent of regional income inequality. As there is no strategic central government, this is
a two period two region model of exogenous horizontal transfers. Joanis (2007) studies
effect of dual provision of public goods on political accountability in a model of adverse
selection when voters are uninformed about the contributions of each level to the public
good. Joanis finds ambiguous results when considering the welfare comparisons in a
move from a completely centralized or decentralized system of public good provision
to one of partial decentralization as the complementarities of public good provision are
traded off against a loss of information, and therefore political accountability.
These papers do not study the dynamics of both the levels and directions of inter-
governmental transfers as they interact with the political system and political agents.
Those papers investigating intergovernmental grants do not incorporate government
actors who are separately elected individuals. This is an important aspect of federa-
tions as empirically many do not have the same political parties at both the central and
federal levels (see Chibber and Kollman (2004)), and those that do not have separate
independent elections of regional and central politicians perform poorly in terms of
growth, accountability and corruption (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006)). In the
following section we present a model with elected political agents who determine the
levels and timing of intergovernmental transfers.
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3 Model
The model presented builds on a basic career concerns model found in Persson and
Tabellini (2000)6. There is a local and central government, each controlled by a self
interested politician. Politicians value the rents obtained from office, and seek to hold
office for a limit of two terms. While in office these politicians decide the level of rents
to enjoy, transfers if any, and the amount of pubic goods to provide. When seeking
re-election these politicians actively behave in the voters’ interest in an attempt to
maintain their hold on office. However, when not seeking re-election these politicians
are unfettered in their satisfaction of their own desires. Thus, in the off-election periods
we refer to these politicians with a term that reflects their image from the point of view
of the voters: a lame duck.
3.1 Preferences
Consider a unit mass of homogenous, infinitely lived voters, who reside under the au-
thority of two levels of government indexed by j ∈ {c, l}. These voters have preferences
for public goods. We assume that voters are myopic, looking ahead one period, or half
a term7. Voters in locality l care for the current levels of public goods provided in their
locality by both the local (gl) and central (gc) levels of government, and a consumption
good c. Voters are endowed with yl units of income which is allocated to a consumption
good and taxes; cl = yl−τl−τc. Voters are risk neutral and have per-period preferences
defined as:
Ul = gl + gc + cl (1)
Politicians care for the rents from office. These rents are of two varieties. Physical
resources can be allocated from the government’s public budget to the desired private
uses of the incumbent. We denote this by r. Also incumbent politicians may attain
6Itself influenced by Holmstrom (1982).
7Voter myopia is not necessary, but it simplifies the exposition dramatically by avoiding the ad-
ditional disincentive that voters have for re-electing incumbents (they are lame ducks). In addition,
because voters recognize the electoral externalities generated by their portfolio of office holders, having
voters look more than one period ahead, doubles the state space over which they form their expectation
of future utility.
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a purely emotional or ego rent from attaining office, R. We state the per period
preferences of a politician in office j in state s as:
V sj = v(r
s
j) +R
s
j (2)
We assume that v′(·) > 0 and v′′(·) < 0. Politicians have a maximum of two terms in
office. We divide each term in office into two parts, the period following an election,
(post election), and the period preceding an election (pre-election). In each of these four
periods in office there is a publicly observed state of the world, s, which is a position
on the electoral/re-electoral calendar. Politicians are either in their first term in office,
Y (young) the term within which they seek re-election, or they are in their second
term in office, O (old) in which they do not seek re-election because of binding term
limits. The state of the world is a tuple, where the first character (upper case) denotes
the term of the central incumbent and the second character (lower case) denotes the
term of the local incumbent. The figures included display simultaneous and staggered
electoral calendars, respectively. Each node in a figure represents the end point of a
period, with a term composed of two periods.
In each period, each politician in either level of government, j ∈ {c, l} provides a public
good. These public goods have a linear technology using the total revenue raised by
the the politician, any transfers received (T ), and the politician’s competence, less the
rents appropriated, and transfers given. We assume that the taxes levied, {τc, τl} are
exogenous. The public good provided by a politician is augmented by the politician’s
competence. Formally,
gl = τl + T − rl + θl
gc = τc − T − rc + θc
Political competence, θj, is unobservable. In each period each politician receives a
shock to their competence. The shock process is a moving average of order two. These
shocks are independent and identically distributed, and uncorrelated with the state.
The competence of an elected official is, θj = µ
′
j +µj where the per period competence
shocks are distributed with cdf Fj(µj), with mean 0 and variance σ
2
j . Primed variables
denote the next period value.
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Figure 1: Simultaneous Electoral Calendar
8
Figure 2: Staggered Electoral Calendar
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We consider a game of imperfect information in which elections are staggered, such that
election periods can occur within terms, but not simultaneously. When elections are
staggered a central incumbent’s post election period coincides with a local incumbent’s
pre-election period and vice versa. In each period the state is determined by the
electoral outcomes of the last period. At the beginning of each period politicians receive
a shock to their competence. Knowing only the state, and not their own competence, or
the competence of the other office holder, politicians decide on the rents appropriated
from office as well as transfers made to the budgets of other office holders. Together
with competence θj, this decision residually determines the public goods provided.
Voters then observe the public good allocations by each government and from this
allocation and their knowledge of the previous state, they form an estimate of the
current competence shock received by each office holder. If it is an election year at
level j ∈ {c, l}, elections take place and voters then vote for the candidate whose
electoral success is associated with the highest payoff to the voters. The outcome of
the election is then observed, and the state is updated to reflect the post election
allocation of politicians to office. A new period begins and the sequence of events is
repeated. Politicians can hold office for a maximum of four periods (two terms). The
per period timing is summarized below:
1. Given a state s, Nature draws competence shocks for each incumbent.
2. Incumbents from each office j, while not observing their competence, select this
period’s rents, rj. The central incumbent selects transfers, T . Together these
choices residually determine the levels of government spending from each office
gj.
3. Voters observe the provisions of public goods from each government and produce
an estimate of the per-period competence shock µj for each politician.
4. Elections are held for an office j ∈ {l, c}. Voters vote and the outcome is observed.
5. The period ends, and state is updated given the outcome of the elections and a
new period begins with Nature’s move.
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We focus on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria with incumbents and challengers
choosing the same state contingent but history independent strategies.
We solve the above stage game by backwards induction. Incumbent politicians face
a trade-off only when they are young. Old incumbents have no interest in re-election
and so they always take the maximum feasible rents from office. The young politicians
have the incentive to reduce rents to increase their re-election prospects by projecting
a higher signal of their competence to the voters. This only matters in the preelection
period of the young office holder’s term, as it is only the last signal of competence that
carries forward to effect the next period’s public provision. Young politicians at the
central level also face a trade-off in their first post election period in office. It is in this
period that young central politicians have the ability to influence the electoral prospects
of the current local incumbent through an intergovernmental transfer of resources. In
any period other than that of their potential re-election, local recipients of said transfers
would not spend them, rather they would employ these resources to increase their own
rents. As we will show, if voters anticipate transfers from challengers, this is sufficient
to motivate incumbents to allocate resources from their budget to that of a locality up
for re-election.
Voters choose elected officials so as to maximize expected government expenditure.
Competence increases the public good provision; therefore voters evaluate each politi-
cian on the basis of their competence, and the equilibrium payoffs associated with
retaining an incumbent and selecting a challenger. Competence being a second order
moving average of shocks, what voters wish is to re-elect an incumbent if and only if the
current shock estimate exceeds the expected shock received by their challenger, which
is zero, and any net benefits that may accrue from accepting a new office holder and
influencing the state transition. Voters use the current estimate to infer the unknown
future competence. Voters evaluate an incumbent office holder’s competence by com-
paring the observed level of government expenditure, gc or gl, with the expected level
of government expenditure, g˜c = τ˜c− T˜ − r˜c or g˜l = τ˜l + T˜ − r˜l respectively . This com-
parison yields an estimate of θj , θˆj. Voters use their current estimate of competence,
θˆj, and their past estimate, ˆθj,−1 to estimate µˆj. As µj is the durable component of
competence, and therefore public good allocation, voters weigh this benefit of retaining
an incumbent, with the equilibrium benefits of election a challenger. Any electoral de-
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cision made by the voters has the ability to change the state, s (recall that the state of
the world indicates whether both incumbents are young and facing re-election or not).
Thus voters best response to the actions of an incumbent is described as a general
election rule:
reelectj(s) =
{
1 if µj ≥ Πs∗j
0 otherwise
(3)
Where µj is the durable component of competence, θj, as accurately estimated by voters
from previous expenditures. Πs∗j is the net benefit from selecting a challenger for office
j , in state s. If voters retain an incumbent by re-electing them, these incumbents are
then old in the next period, facing no further re-election incentives to spend, therefore
leaving as the sole gain from retention the durable component of their competence
µj. This competence level must exceed any benefit accruing to voters from selecting a
challenger, Πs
′∗
j , which is determined in equilibrium. s
′ is a subset of {Y o, Y y,Oy,Oo},
depending on which office j is up for re-election.
Note that, old incumbents simply take maximal rents, rj in both periods when old inde-
pendently of the state or the voter’s re-election rule8. Maximum rents are determined
by the feasible set in that they cannot exceed the revenue raised by the government
either through taxes or transfers. We can define the value of office for an old incumbent
in office j as Wj:
Wj = ((1 + β)v(rj) +Rj)
Thus we can concentrate on the strategies of the young incumbents. Young incumbents
are in office in for two periods, their last being a pre-election period. Given the re-
election rule employed by voters, incumbents seeking office maximize the value of office,
which is their current enjoyment of rents plus their expected benefits from the retention
of office. For the central incumbent this is characterized as:
max
rc
v(rc) + βE[Wc] (4)
The expectation is taken over the state, that is, their re-election prospect. Let pc =
[1−Fc(τ˜c−T˜− r˜c−[τc−T−rc]+Πs′∗c )]. This is the probability that a central incumbent
8This can be augmented by assuming that there are parties and that party discipline serves the
role of ensuring that old incumbents do not take maximal rents, as the party has a longer horizon
than the incumbents two terms of office.
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is re-elected. Re-election occurs when the estimate of the current competence shock
implies a benefit to voters that exceeds that associated with selecting a challenger,
who would yield competence of E[θ] = 0, and a state dependent net benefit of Πs
′∗
c , as
determined in equilibrium. The first order condition for the incumbent is then given
by:
∂v(rc)
∂r
− βfc(·)Wc = 0 (5)
Similarly for a incumbent at the local level, the probability of their re-election is pl =
[1 − Fl(τ˜l + T˜ − r˜l − [τl + T − rl] + Πs′∗l )], where again Πs′∗l is an equilibrium object.
Facing re-election, a local incumbent’s objective is to maximize their utility from office:
max
rl
v(rl) + βE[Wl] (6)
The incumbent trades off the utility from consuming the rents from office today with
the cost of consuming those rents, the probability of being re-elected to enjoy the
benefits of office again tomorrow. This yields a first order condition:
∂v(rl)
∂r
− βfl(·)Wl = 0 (7)
Central incumbents have an opportunity to make transfers. In the pre-election period
of their first term central politicians are concerned with their own re-election prospects.
There are no transfers from or to old politicians, since donating old politicians derive no
benefit from the transfer, and receiving old politicians would never spend the transfer,
instead allocating the resources to their own private rent consumption. Therefore,
with staggered elections central incumbents will only divert resources from their own
rent consumption in state Y y, when both central and local incumbents are in their first
term. Note that this diversion of resources will only take place in the period when local
incumbents are actively seeking re-election, their pre-election period because they are
already old if it is their post election period.
Now consider the central incumbent in the first period of their first term in office, with a
young local incumbent seeking re-election. First, we know that the central government
allocates no resources towards the public good, gc, as they are not themselves seeking
re-election and there is no informational spillover as each politicians’ competence is
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an independent process. Thus, all transfers come from a reduction in the central
government’s rent consumption.
max
T
v(rc − T ) + βE[max
r′c
v(rs
′
c ) + βp
s′
c Wc] (8)
In this case the expectation again is taken over the future state; s ∈ {Y y, Y o}, however
it is the local government’s re-election prospects that are of importance to the central
incumbent. If voters use a state dependent re-election rule, next period (pre-election)
rent extraction by the central incumbent is state dependent as well as the central
incumbent’s own re-election prospects. Recall that in the post election period for the
central incumbent their rents are always maximal so Wc is not state dependent. Thus
the above yields a first order condition:
−∂v(rc − T )
∂T
+ βfl(·)[v(rY o∗c′ )− v(rY y∗c′ ) + [pc,Y o − pc,Y y]Wc] = 0 (9)
The term [pc,Y o − pc,Y y]Wc represents the change in the re-election rule employed by
voters as the state changes. This illustrates that the central incumbent’s incentive to
allocate transfers depends critically on the difference in the rents from office and re-
election prospects in the two states Y o and Y y. While the disincentive to give transfers
is the foregone rents today, the incentive to allocate transfers must be higher expected
future benefits. These rents tomorrow are determined in equilibrium and we discuss
these objects in detail below.
4 Equilibrium
We are interested in pure strategy, stationary, symmetric Markov perfect equilibria,
where challengers are expected to take the same actions in equilibrium as incumbents
and vice versa. The actions of both voters and politicians may be state dependent. An
equilibrium is defined as:
Definition. A Rational Expectations Political Equilibrium, REPE, is a pure strat-
egy, symmetric, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, consisting of a vector of state con-
tingent actions by elected officials, {rs∗l , rs∗c , T s∗}, and (re-)election rules of voters
{reelectl,s, reelectc,s} such that: (i) each action by voters is a best response to those
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of incumbents, (ii) each action by incumbents is a best response to the actions of vot-
ers, (iii) each action in {rs∗l , rs∗c , T s∗} is equal to it’s expected value {r˜s∗l , r˜s∗c , T˜ s∗l }, (iv)
and actions are sequentially rational, given expectations.
There are at least two REPE, in the game described above, one with no transfers, and
the other with non-zero transfers. We describe each in detail below.
4.1 No transfer equilibrium
In the no transfer equilibrium, neither voters nor incumbents expect transfers from
either the current central incumbent or the future central incumbent (the challenger).
As the old incumbents always take maximal rents, the expected payoff from re-electing
an incumbent at either level is given by the current period competence shock of the
incumbent. This payoff must exceed the expected benefits from electing a challenger,
who by definition is young and has expected competence of E[θ] = 0. In the no-
transfer equilibrium, voters are expecting zero transfers from new incumbents, there is
no state contingent surplus associated with a change from Y y to Y o or from Oy to Oo,
shocks and elections are independent and each incumbent is evaluated independently
by voters. As both new incumbents (challengers) and old incumbent do not differ in
their first period actions (both take maximal rents) the state-transition specific surplus
is Π∗j = 0. The equilibrium re-election rule is simplified to:
reelectj =
{
1 if µj ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(10)
Given this, the pre-election period decisions for incumbents in both levels are identical:
max
rj
v(rj) + βE[Wj] j = c, l (11)
The expectation is taken over the current competence as embedded in the voters re-
election rule. In this case the probability of re-election is the probability that the
current competence shock of an incumbent exceeds the expected value (zero), which is
pj = [1− Fj(τ˜j − r˜j − [τj − rj])]. The first order condition reads:
dv(rj)
drj
− βfj(·)Wj = 0 (12)
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As voters have rational expectations we have, r∗j ≡ r˜j. Define h(rj) as the inverse
function of the marginal utility of rents h(rj) =
dv
drj
−1
giving the following equation
defining the current period equilibrium rents:
r∗j = h (βfj(0)Wj) (13)
Proposition 1. There exists an REPE without transfers. The no-transfer equilib-
rium, {rs∗l , rs∗c , T s∗, reelectsl , reelectsc} Is characterized by r∗j = rj = r˜j in post-election
periods, r∗j = h
(
βfj(0)[v(rj) +R
′
j]
)
= r˜j in pre-election periods, and T = T˜ = 0.
Voters re-elect incumbents on the basis of competence only and there is no incum-
bency advantage or disadvantage. Each incumbent seeking re-election is re-elected with
probability 0.5 if the distribution is symmetric.
In this equilibrium incumbents and challengers face equal chances of being reelected if
the distribution is symmetric. With rents in the no transfer equilibrium described as
above, we can describe the state specific government expenditures in each of the four
periods under the staggered electoral calendar. In the post election period of either
term gj is equal to θj, the competence of the politician.
gj =
{
θj in the post election period of either term
τj − h
(
βfj(0)[v(rj) +R
′
j]
)
+ θj in the pre-election period
(14)
As elections are staggered, we can calculate the state dependent welfare of the repre-
sentative voter when transfers are zero.
Welfare¬T =

θl + θc + cl post-election Oo, Y y
and pre-election Oo,
τc − h (βfc(0)[v(rc) +R′c]) + θc + θl + cl pre-election Y o,Y y
τl − h (βfl(0)[v(rl) +R′l]) + θl + θc + cl pre-election Oy,Y y
(15)
While welfare differs in the different states, there is no reason for voters to change their
reelection rule that is based on competence in pursuit of greater state specific welfare.
The reason is that in the post-election periods each newly elected or re-elected official
takes a period off of spending, enjoying the rents available to them through the budget.
16
4.2 Transfer Equilibrium
We now show that an equilibrium with positive transfers exists, wherein these transfers
are anticipated by both voters and incumbent politicians in state Y y. The intuition of
the transfer equilibrium is as follows. First, transfers from central to local governments
only occur when both are in their first term of office, and when the local incumbent is
facing re-election. In any other situation either: a) the central government is unwilling
to make transfers because they are concerned with their own re-election (or because
they are concerned with their own rent consumption (lame duck)) or b) local govern-
ments would spend transferred money on rents only. This last insight arises as local
governments are not constrained from appropriating any resources made available to
them. If transfers occur, local government spending increases and central government
spending remains the same. Transfers come out of rents that would be consumed at
the central level. Together this implies that voters benefit from a transfer. Finally, if
voters expect transfers being made between two first term government officials, and
prefer the state of the world in which both officials are in their first term, then voters
will set higher re-election hurdles for governments when the transition to a state with
transfers is possible. This makes getting re-elected more difficult. The central gov-
ernment’s incentives are to avoid the state of the world where both central and local
incumbents are in their first term in office (as this is the state where transfers take
place).
We again begin with the voters who choose to re-elect the central incumbent according
to a state contingent re-election rule. If the local government was re-elected the state
is now Y o or Oo. As there is no re-election at the central level in state Oo, we first
consider state Y y. In this case, regardless of what state voters find themselves in post
election, they are faced with a situation in which local incumbents take the same action.
Hence, voters base their decision on competence alone, and voter’s re-election rule for
the central incumbent is:
reelectc =
{
1 if µc ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(16)
If the local government was not re-elected, a new local challenger has taken office and
the state is Y y. The re-election of a central government would involve a transition to
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state Oy. However, if the central incumbent is not re-elected the state again becomes
Y y, the state in which transfers among governments is expected. Formally we have:
reelectc =
{
1 if µc ≥ ΠY y∗c
0 otherwise
(17)
Where ΠY y∗c = g
Y y∗
c + g
Y y∗
l − (gOy∗c + gOy∗l ) is the difference in equilibrium public good
levels across the two possible states. Note that the subsequent period is by definition a
post election period for the central government. For this reason the central incumbent
has no reason to provide public goods herself. It follows from the central government’s
budget constraint, gc = τc−T−rc+θc that gY y∗c = gOy∗c = θc. If transfers take place they
come out of the central incumbent’s rents. The next period is a re-election period for
the local government in which the local budget constraint must bind. In state Y y this
constraint is gl = τl+ T˜ −rl+θl, and in Oy we have gl = τl−rl+θl. Thus the expected
difference between the public goods provided in each state is ΠY y∗c = g
Y y∗
l − gOy∗l , and
the difference between these two levels of government expenditure at the local level
is determined by the equilibrium transfer in state Y y and the expected difference in
rents extracted by the local incumbent in each state:ΠY y∗c = T˜ + (
˜rOyl − ˜rY yl ).We refer
to ΠY y∗c as the equilibrium electoral externality imposed upon the incumbent at the
central level. This externality is the sum of the expected transfer allocated by a central
challenger, and the difference between rent extraction by the local government in states
Oy and Y y. This second term arises as local governments may respond to the received
transfers.
Given the re-election rules employed by voters we can derive the optimal rent extraction
for the central incumbent in each state. The central incumbent in state Y y solves:
max
rY yc
v(rY yc ) + βE[Wc] (18)
The expectation is taken over the current competence as embedded in the voters re-
election rule. In this case the probability of re-election is the probability that the
current competence shock of an incumbent exceeds the expected competence of the
challenger, zero, plus T˜ and electoral externality. We have this probability in the
following form pc = [1− Fc(τ˜c − r˜c − [τc − rc] + ΠY y∗c )]. In the period when the central
incumbent faces re-election, transfers have already been made in the previous period,
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and so the central incumbent chooses rent extraction to maximize their utility from
office9. This yields a first order condition:
dv(rY yc )
drY yc
− βfc(·)Wc = 0 (19)
As voters have rational expectations we have, rs∗j ≡ r˜sj for all s and j. Again let h(rc)
denote the inverse function of the marginal utility of rents h(rc) =
dv
drc
−1
giving the
following equation defining the current period equilibrium rents:
rY y∗c = h
(
βfc(Π
Y y∗
c )Wc
)
(20)
We can likewise solve for the incumbent’s optimal rent consumption in state Y o. This
program is identical to that of the non-transfer equilibrium and we have:
rY o∗c = h (βfc(0)Wc) (21)
Notice that rents extracted by the central incumbent may differ in states Y y and Y o
depending on the properties of the distribution of competence.
The state the central government finds itself in depends on the outcome of the local
government election. The local government’s rent consumption is chosen optimally
given the re-election rule employed by the voters for the local government election.
Formally in state Y y we have:
reelectl =
{
1 if µl ≥ ΠY y∗l
0 otherwise
(22)
Where ΠY y∗l = g
Y y∗
c + g
Y y∗
l − (gY o∗c + gY o∗l ). Again, we can observe that post-election
rents extracted by the local incumbent are maximal, rl. From the budget constraint
of the local government we see that gY yl = g
Y o
l = θl. Any difference in public good
provision in the period following a local government election will arise from differences
in the public goods provided by the central government, as a period following a local
election is a period prior to a central election. From the central government’s budget
constraint, given the expected value of competence is zero we have: ΠY y∗l = (
˜rY oc − ˜rY yc ),
9This is because transfers will not take place in the periods when voters evaluate the central
incumbent as the resources are always better allocated towards their own re-election or their own rent
consumption
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as the difference in government expenditure at the central level. Thus in state Y y local
governments solve the following program:
max
rY yl
v(rY yl ) + βE[Wl] (23)
In this case the probability of re-election is the probability that the current competence
shock of the local incumbent exceeds the expected competence of the challenger, zero,
plus an electoral externality imposed by the change in behavior of the central incumbent
when the state changes. This probability has the following form pl = [1− Fl(τ˜l + T˜ −
r˜l − [τl + T − rl] + ΠY y∗l )].
This yields a first order condition:
dv(rY yl )
drY yl
− βfl(·)Wl = 0 (24)
Again imposing rational expectations we have, rs∗j ≡ r˜sj for all s and j, and T ∗ = T˜ .
Using h(rl) we arrive at the following equation defining the current period equilibrium
rents for the local incumbent as a function of the equilibrium electoral externality:
rY y∗l = h
(
βfl(Π
Y y∗
l )Wl
)
(25)
The equilibrium electoral externality is a function of the rent extraction from the central
level, and so this equilibrium rent function is the optimal rent extraction at the local
level given the rent extraction at the central level.
We can likewise solve for the local incumbent’s optimal rent consumption in the state
Oy, when the central incumbent was re-elected. In this case the equilibrium electoral
externality will be zero as second term central incumbents are lame ducks without
re-election concerns and have no reason to give transfers to local incumbents. Thus in
state Oy the sub-game for the local incumbent is identical to that in the non-transfer
equilibrium and we have the same optimal rents as defined by:
rOy∗l = h (βfl(0)Wl) (26)
Again depending on the specific distribution for competence (an assumption on f ′),
rents for the local incumbent may differ in states Y y and Oy.
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Finally we can solve for the central incumbent politician’s transfer to the young local
politician. The central government makes a transfer to influence the electoral outcome
of the local government election. They desire to do so to increase the probability that
the local incumbent is re-elected. When the local incumbent has been re-elected the
central incumbent finds herself in the most favorable state, where both their own rents
and their future re-election prospects are highest. Thus, in state Y y the transfer is
chosen as that which maximizes the utility of the central incumbent. Again letting W
denote the continuation payoff for a central incumbent conditional on a win in their
election, in state Y y we have the central incumbent’s post-election problem:
max
T
v(rc − T ) + βE[max
rc
v(rc(s
′)) + βWj] (27)
In this case the expectation again is taken over the state, however it is the local
government’s re-election prospects that are of importance to the central incumbent
when choosing the transfer, as the transfer affects the probability of changing the state
in which the central incumbent is re-elected:pl = [1−Fl(τ˜l+T˜− r˜l−[τl+T−rl]+ΠY y∗l )].
In the event that the local incumbent is not re-elected ,the central incumbent’s next
period rents and re-election prospects are lower and this occurs with probability 1−pl.
This yields a first order condition:
−∂v(rc − T )
∂T
+ βfl(Π
Y y∗
l )
(
[v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )] + β[Fc(ΠY y∗c )− Fc(0)]Wc
)
= 0 (28)
Imposing the condition that expectations of actions are equal to their equilibrium
values, and making use of the h(·) function defined above, the equilibrium transfers
are the fixed point that satisfies:
T ∗ = rc − h
(
βfl(Π
Y y∗
l )
(
[v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )] + β[Fc(T ∗ + ( ˜rOyl − ˜rY yl ))− Fc(0)]Wc
))
(29)
We can show that there exists a T ∗ strictly greater than 0 that satisfies the above
condition.
Lemma 1. There exists a value of T on the interval (0, rc] that satisfies T
∗ = rc −
h
(
βfl(Π
Y y∗
l )
(
[v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )] + β[Fc(T ∗ + ( ˜rOyl − ˜rY yl ))− Fc(0)]Wc
))
.
Proof. h
(
βfl(Π
Y y∗
l )
(
[v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )] + β[Fc(T ∗ + ( ˜rOyl − ˜rY yl ))− Fc(0)]Wc
))
is a
continuous strictly decreasing function on the entire domain of T , and therefore also on
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any sub interval thereof, including (0, rc]. This is shown as the argument on which h(·)
is evaluated must be non-decreasing in T in equilibrium. A fixed point exists where
this decreasing function is equal to rc − T ∗, also a decreasing function of T . For an
equilibrium these two curves must intersect on the interval (0, rc].
For simplicity assume that the distribution functions for the local and central politi-
cians’ competence shocks are identical: Fc(·) = Fl(·) = F (·)10.
We can summarize the requirements of the pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium of the game described above. All expected actions are equal to their equi-
librium values, and these equilibrium values are the dominant strategies for each player
given those taken by every other player. While the stage game is repeated, the players
themselves play for a finite number of periods, thus we simply need to solve each stage
game by backwards induction. These optimal strategies are determined by the condi-
tions listed below.
Voting in each election is optimal given the state transition payoffs, and estimated
competence:
reelectY yc =
{
1 if µc ≥ ΠY yc
0 otherwise
(30)
reelectY yl =
{
1 if µl ≥ ΠY yl
0 otherwise
(31)
reelectsj =
{
1 if µj ≥ Πsj if s ∈ {Y o,Oy}
0 otherwise
(32)
Central incumbent’s rent extraction satisfies:
r˜sc = r
s
c =
{
h
(
βfc(Π
Y y
c )Wc
)
if s = Y y
h (βfc(0)Wc) if s 6= Y y
(33)
Local incumbent’s rent extraction satisfies:
r˜sl = r
s
l =
{
h
(
βfc(Π
Y y
l )Wl
)
if s = Y y
h (βfc(0)Wc) if s 6= Y y
(34)
10This assumption can easily be relaxed, particularly when one wishes to make the natural assump-
tion that Fc(x) ≤ Fl(x) for all x, i.e. that Fc first order stochastically dominates Fl. This may be the
case, if in order to run in the national competition some screening process is present that is absent at
the local level.
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Finally the central incumbent’s transfer decision satisfies T s = T˜ s. When s 6= Y y,
then T˜ s = 0. However when s = Y y we have the following:
T˜ s = rc − h
(
βfl(·)
(
[v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )] + β[Fc(T˜ + ( ˜rOyl − ˜rY yl ))− Fc(0)]Wc
))
(35)
Proposition 2. There exists an REPE with positive transfers whenever either of the
following conditions is satisfied:
i) f ′ = 0 ∀ µ ∈ [µmin, µmax]
ii) f ′ > 0 for µ ∈ [−, ] , 1 >>  > 0
iii) f ′ < 0 for µ ∈ [−, ] , 1 >>  > 0, T∗ > |rOy∗l − rY y∗l |, β[F (T + rOy∗l − rY y∗l )−
F (0)]Wc > |v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )|
In the transfer equilibrium, {rs∗l , rs∗c , T s∗, reelectsl , reelectsc} is characterized by T =
T˜ , r∗j = rj = r˜j in post-election periods, and r
s∗
j = h (βfj(0)Wj) = r˜
s
j in
pre-election periods when either of the office holders in not young, s ∈ Oy, Y o.
When the state is Y y we have rY y∗l = h
(
βfl(
˜rY yc − ˜rY oc )Wl
)
= ˜rY yl , and r
Y y∗
c =
h (βfc(E[T
∗] + ( ˜rl,Oy − ˜rl,Y y))Wc) = ˜rY yc . Voters re-elect incumbents on the basis of
competence and the electoral externality presented by the state contingent actions of
the other office holder.
Proof. Case (i): When f ′ = 0, µ is a uniformly distributed random variable on an
interval {µmin, µmax}. Imposing the equilibrium condition that expected values equal
their anticipated values ensures that conditions (31)-(36) are satisfied. In particular
the dominant strategy for the central incumbent is to set rY o∗c = h
(
β 1
µmax−µminWc
)
=
rY y∗c in pre-election periods and rc in all post election periods. Similarly the local
incumbent’s optimal strategy is to set rY o∗l = h
(
β 1
µmax−µminWl
)
= rY y∗l in pre-election
periods and rl in all post election periods. The equilibrium payoff to voters from
choosing the challenger at a central election when both incumbents are young is ΠY yc =
T and at the local election we have ΠY yl = 0. Thus voters re-elect the central incumbent
only if the payoff from doing so exceeds the payoff associated with the challenger:
µc > T
∗. Likewise voters re-elect the local incumbent only if µl > 0. T ∗ is the fixed
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point that satisfies lemma 1, which is positive in state Y y given Wc is large enough.
Case (ii): Consider11 f ′ > 0 in the interval [0, b] where b = T + rOyl − rY yl . Again,
all players are playing optimal strategies, and conditions (31)-(36) are satisfied. In
this case rY o∗c = h (βfc(0)Wc) > r
Y y∗
c = h
(
βf(T + rOyl − rY yl )Wc
)
in pre-election
periods and rc in all post election periods. Similarly r
Y o∗
l = h (βf(0)Wl) > r
Y y∗
l =
h
(
βf(rY oc − rY yl )Wl
)
in pre-election periods and rl in all post election periods. The
equilibrium payoff to voters from choosing the challenger at a central election when
both incumbents are young is ΠY yc = T + r
Oy
l − rY yl and at the local election we have
ΠY yl = r
Y o
c −rY yl . Thus voters re-elect the central incumbent only if µc > T +rOyl −rY yl
and re-elect the local incumbent only if µl > r
Y o
c − rY yl . T ∗ is the fixed point that
satisfies lemma 1.
Case (iii): Consider f ′ < 0 in the interval [0, b] where b = T + rOyl − rY yl 12. Again,
all players are playing dominant strategies, and conditions (31)-(36) are satisfied. In
this case rY o∗c = h (βfc(0)Wc) < r
Y y∗
c = h
(
βf(T + rOyl − rY yl )Wc
)
in pre-election
periods and rc in all post election periods. Similarly r
Y o∗
l = h (βf(0)Wl) < r
Y y∗
l =
h
(
βf(rY oc − rY yl )Wl
)
in pre-election periods and rl in all post election periods. The
equilibrium payoff to voters from choosing the challenger at a central election when
both incumbents are young is ΠY yc = T + r
Oy
l − rY yl and at the local election we
have ΠY yl = r
Y o
c − rY yc which in this case is negative. Thus voters re-elect the central
incumbent only if µc > T + r
Oy
l − rY yl and re-elect the local incumbent only if µl >
rY oc −rY yl . T ∗ is the fixed point that satisfies lemma 1. This is an equilibrium whenever:
the equilibrium benefit from electing a challenger is greater than 0, T∗ > |rOy∗l − rY y∗l |,
and the payoff to the incumbent from the local incumbent’s re-election in state Y y is
greater than the difference in the utility loss from rents associated in state Y y and Y o;
β[F (T + rOy∗l − rY y∗l )− F (0)]Wc > |v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )|.
The above shows that we have an equilibrium with transfers, however it is dependent on
the distribution of competence. The reason for this dependence is that in an equilibrium
with transfers there is always an incentive for the incumbent to avoid the state in which
a challenger has an advantage of being able to provide a transfer, however depending
on how the wedge created by the transfer affects the probability of being re-elected
11This will be true for some negatively skewed distributions.
12This will be true for all symmetric and some positively skewed distributions.
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on the margin, rents selected may be higher or lower in this state. To see how the
structure of the equilibrium operates in the absence of the electoral externalities let us
focus on an example when the competence shocks are distributed uniformly.
Example 1. Consider the following distribution for competence µ ∼ U [−φ
2
, φ
2
] and a
logarithmic functional form for the incumbent’s preferences for rents. The timing is
as stated above. Equilibrium rents chosen are the same in each state with the central
incumbent selecting rY o∗c = r
Y y∗
c =
φ
βWc
and the local incumbent selecting rOy∗l = r
Y y∗
l =
φ
βWl
. The transfers from the first stage are given by:
T ∗ = rc − h
(
βfl(Π
Y y∗
l )
(
[v(rY o∗c )− v(rY y∗c )] + β[Fc(T ∗ + ( ˜rOyl − ˜rY yl ))− Fc(0)]Wc
))
With logarithmic preferences this simplifies to:
T = rc − 1
β 1
φ
(
β[
T−φ
2
φ
− 1
2
]Wc
)
Rearranging we can solve for T ∗:
T ∗ =
β2Wc
φ
+ β
2Wcrc
φ2
±
√
(β
2Wc
φ
+ β
2Wcrc
φ2
)2 + 4(β
2Wc
φ2
)(β
2Wcrc
φ
− 1)
2β
2Wc
φ2
This T ∗ is has two real roots when φ2(β4W 2c + 4β
2Wc) + β
4W 2c rc > φ2β
4W 2c rc
If β = 0.5, φ = 4, Wc = 100, and rc = 10 we have:
T ∗ =
21.88± 13.28
3.13
= 11.23 or 2.75
Clearly the first root is not feasible as it exceeds the budget, so the equilibrium value of
T ∗ is 2.75.
In this equilibrium, the re-election rates are 0.5 in all states but Y y, when the equilib-
rium re-election rate is:
T ∗ − 2
4
=
2.75− 2
4
=
0.75
4
=
3
16
It is this state Y y which the central incumbents wish to avoid by allocating the transfer
to the local incumbent.
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From this example we see that local incumbents are no better off in this equilibrium
as their rents and re-election rates are identical to that in the equilibrium without
transfers. When comparing the utility of central incumbents in the equilibria with
and without transfers it is clear that central incumbents would prefer the equilibrium
without transfers, but conditional on the expectation of transfers their utility is in-
creasing in the transfer. Voters are the real winners with transfers as these funds are
diverted from their only other use: rents. Public good spending therefore increases in
the state when transfers take place and voters have higher welfare due to the increased
electoral competition invoked by the expectation of transfers. In general we can state
the following corollary:
Corollary. Voter welfare in an equilibrium with transfers is higher whenever f ′ ≥ 0
on the interval [0, T + rOyl − rY yl ]. For f ′ < 0 on the interval [0, T + rOyl − rY yl ], welfare
is higher whenever (rY yc − rY oc )F (rY oc − rY yc ) < T .
Recall that the utility of a voter is their consumption of government expenditures, and
the private consumption good. We will write this for each state:
WelfareT =

θl + τl + θc − rY y∗l + cl + T local pre-election Y y,
θl + τc + θc − rY y∗c + cl central pre-election Y y,
θl + τc + θc − rY o∗c + cl central pre-election Y o,
θl + τl + θc − rOy∗l + cl local pre-election Oy,
θl + θc + cl all other periods Oo, Y o,Oy,
(36)
Notice that the welfare of voters is strictly higher in state Y y as a result of the transfer
when rents are lower in the transfer equilibrium, i.e. f ′ ≥ 0. However when rents are
higher as a result of the transfer, f ′ < 0, voters are better off in the local pre-election
period when both incumbents are young as a result of the transfer, but worse off in
the central pre-election period as central rents are higher in the transfer equilibrium in
this case.
In the equilibrium with transfers re-election prospects are strictly lower for both levels
of government due to the presence of an electoral externality. Voters no longer con-
cern themselves with competence only, and also replace incumbents when it involves
a change to a challenger who is more likely to allocate transfers to them. In addi-
tion to this, the utility of the central incumbents is also lower, as the transfer itself
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involves foregoing rents that would otherwise be allocated to the incumbent’s private
rent consumption. Notice however that the rent consumption depends on the state of
the world, and the distribution function so in some states, politicians at the central
level are no worse off and local incumbents may in fact be better off. Nevertheless we
can state the following.
Corollary. Central incumbent utility in an equilibrium with transfers does not exceed
central incumbent utility in an equilibrium without transfers. Local incumbent utility
in the equilibrium with transfers may be less than, greater than or equal to that of the
equilibrium without transfers.
Local incumbents react to the transfer by the reallocation of rents. In cases when f ′ ≤ 0
local incumbents are no worse off when the central government allocates transfers,
however if f ′ > 0 rent extraction decreases in the period in which they receive transfers
as voters anticipate higher rents from the central incumbent if the local incumbent is
re-elected.
Average competence at the central level is also lower, as voters take more draws from
the distribution of politicians, but keep less of those whose competence is greater than
the mean when incumbent politicians are held to a higher standard. This negative effect
for voters is offset by the transfers themselves. At the local level average competence
may be less than, greater than or equal to it’s value in the equilibrium without transfers.
Proposition 3. Average competence at the central level in the equilibrium with trans-
fers is strictly lower than average competence in the equilibrium without transfers. Av-
erage competence at the local level in the equilibrium with transfers does not exceed that
of the equilibrium without transfers.
Proof. The average competence without elections is equal to the expected value of the
competence shocks: E[θj] = 2E[µ] = 0. Elections serve to retain politicians whose
competence is above some threshold. Without transfers this threshold at both levels
is the average µ = 0 and so we have:
E[θc] =
∫ µmax
0
µdF (µ)
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When in a transfer equilibrium at the central level we have:
E[θc] =
∫ µmax
ΠY yc
ηdF (µ)
Which is less than the above whenever ΠY yc > 0, which is true when transfers occur.
Similarly for the local election we have:
E[θl] =
∫ µmax
ΠY yl
ηdF (µ)
However note that depending on the curvature of the distribution function, as in cases
of proposition 2, ΠY yl may be greater, less than, or equal to zero depending on the
curvature of the distribution of competence. Notice that the only instance when the
interval over which we integrate increases is that when ΠY yl is negative, thus decreasing
the average competence.
5 Discussion
In an equilibrium with transfers, incumbent governments exert electoral externalities
on each other depending on their tenure in office. These electoral externalities arise be-
cause transfers unambiguously increase public spending, distorting the electoral choice
of voters. Without transfers the sole issue at the ballot box is the competence of the
candidates. With transfers voters not only evaluate politicians on the basis of their
competence, but also on the expected transfer received when this politician is in office.
Transfers take place when both central and local politicians are in their first term. Vot-
ers therefore prefer a central-local pair of incumbents that will generate transfers. This
presents electoral externalities that in equilibrium will affect the rent selection activity
of both central and local governments, if it also affects the probability of re-election on
the margin.
A transfer equilibrium does not require that a central incumbent has an intrinsic pref-
erence for a particular office holder at the local level. This is an interesting insight of
the model. What is required is that both the central incumbent and the voters expect
that a challenger will give a transfer to a local government should the local challenger
be elected. Thus the essence of the model is that by making a transfer, the incumbent
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increases their own re-election prospects by sabotaging their future challenger. This
allowed us to discuss the effect of transfers on political accountability in the absence
of parties.
It would be interesting to introduce parties into this framework. Notice that this model
requires that only one party can commit to the allocation of transfers in order for a
transfer equilibrium to emerge where both parties give transfers in pre-election periods.
This can explain discretionary intergovernmental transfers in systems where distinctly
different parties operate on the national and local levels. Chhibber and Kollman (2004)
study the presence of national parties in federations, showing that there is variation
across countries and time in the prevalence of the same parties operating at both the
national and sub-national levels. The ability for purely partisan based discretionary
transfers to take place requires as a pre-requisite that the same parties operate at both
levels of government, something which is not true in general, particularly for municipal
politics, much of which involves non-partisan electoral competition.
That the transfer equilibrium involves higher voter welfare, than the equilibrium in
the absence of transfers requires further comment. Previous research has established
that transfers are good for recipients, but bad in general. In this model there is no
segmentation at the sub-central level, the single local government is the only local
government and there is no rivalry of the transfer. Incorporating multiple regions
into this framework would allow for such a feature13. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya
(2007) show that those countries that have decentralized authority and resources to
more local levels of government perform better when national parties are strong, as
strong national parties can create an incentive for career concerned politicians to refrain
from misallocating centrally collected revenues that are directed to their authoritative
control. The model in our paper can be augmented to incorporate political ambitions
of the local governments, if central politicians desire to select their successors from
a pool of locally elected politicians. This would require immutable characteristics of
politicians, which is outside the scope of the current paper as well as a formal statement
of why central governments would operate in this way. We will not discuss this point
13However doing so would require augmenting the model of political competition to one in which
both the incumbent and challenger play a more active role in each election. One suggested manner of
incorporating this feature is the introduction of uninformed voters, who vote for parties.
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further, but to state only that the incentive for an incumbent to make a transfer when
one is expected of the challenger in a particular state of the world will remain a partial
incentive for transfers in a model of electoral competition with forward looking voters.
This model produces multiple equilibria, raising two important questions regarding
the insights arrived at from this research. The first is how would an equilibrium
with transfers arise? And the second is which equilibrium would we expect to be
selected. The answer to the former rests in the main feature of the environment; voters
forecast the expected rents delivered by a challenger. If national parties enter the
local arena or local parties enter the national arena we should expect that they can
credibly claim to deliver transfers if elected. One party with this ability is enough
to generate the equilibrium. This means that even if there is no intrinsic reason for
an incumbent to transfer resources to their sub-national counterpart, the expectation
that their challenger will do so is sufficient to generate a transfer equilibrium. This
assumption is surely the weakest one can make to support an equilibrium with transfers.
As for the selection of such an equilibrium, we can see one striking reason we would
expect to coordination on the equilibrium without transfers. Since it is the politicians
who are worse off in the equilibrium with transfers, if politicians could create an insti-
tution that allowed them to coordinate with voters on the no transfer equilibrium, they
would like to do so. One such coordination device would be to eliminate the possibility
of transfers in the constitution. Such an action may be politically unpopular among
voters, but popular among all politicians. Indeed this work may shed light on why
would would expect to see self interested politicians commit to instituting formulaic
grant programs in much of the world. Rarely do we see such practices of “tying ones’
hands” unless it is expected to benefit the policy makers themselves.
Relaxing the assumption of myopic voting would complicate things, but the above
intuition would still hold. If voters look ahead two periods, a full term, when making
their re-election decision, their re-election rules in both the equilibrium with transfers
and without changes as voters raise the bar on incumbents, only keeping those whose
competence is high enough to off-set the difference between having a lame duck in
office and having a young incumbent who will spend. This would lead to a further
reduction, or increase in rents depending on the curvature of the distribution function.
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The complication arises as a full term for one office holder, corresponds with one half
term for the other office holder and so in this environment with staggered elections one
must consider the effect of a current electoral decision on the future electoral decisions.
This third order contagion across elections at different levels over time would add little,
particularly as it introduces another level of uncertainty.
Again, while our approach here is without the assumption that transfers are intrin-
sically valued by politicians, or flow in particular ways ex ante, it is not without ap-
plication to such environments. In fact, if parties existed whereby transfers followed
a partisan line we would see a similar equilibrium wherein voters pay some attention
to partisan matching and somewhat less to competence. However, even with the in-
tention of partisan matching, parties must themselves commit to a flow of transfers,
something which becomes increasingly difficult when one considers the coordination
required among regions to change a national government.
It is the coarseness of the voters’ actions which forces the transfer equilibrium to
have such stark properties. Voters can only make one choice with their ballot, and
if transfers increase their welfare, then surely they will be pursued at the expense of
political competence. It is this raising of the bar that makes politicians worse off, but
they are unable to avoid its implications and thus themselves give transfers to affect
their own re-election prospects.
Two things this paper does not address are: partisan motivated transfers, and simulta-
neous election dates. When parties matter for transfers researchers often begin with a
statement about the alignment between local and central political party preferences. If
one wished to introduce such a motivation in this environment we conjecture that the
results would intuitively still apply, however one must then assert whether politicians
use transfers to target supporters or swing voters, and at which level of partisanship,
if we allow voters to split their ticket. The strength of either assumption in such an
environment reduces the insight attainable from the research. In a partisan environ-
ment transfers may not be made to effect re-election prospects explicitly. It is quite
likely that these transfers serve a role of attaining partisan discipline. Future work
modeling the internal organization of party structures and how parties overcome a lack
of political commitment should prove a fruitful endeavor.
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6 Conclusion
This paper studies intergovernmental transfers in a model with rational voters and
politicians. We find that an equilibrium exists where central incumbents make transfers
to local governments in order to favorably effect their own re-election prospects and
rent consumption. This work displays how the structure associated with the electoral
calendar itself can generate an equilibrium with intergovernmental transfers. While no
parties exist in the model the results generated persist once one extends the model to an
environment where central-local politician matching forms a motivation for transfers.
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